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When is ordinary law-making tolerated? 
Enrico Colombatto* 
Abstract 
Institutions matter: they affect individual action, influence cooperation, and are crucial in making the 
difference between wealth and poverty, growth and stagnation. Yet, the explanatory power of  modern 
institutional theorizing has not been exceedingly satisfactory.  
In contrast with the mainstream perspective, this paper suggests a theory of  institutional dynamics based 
on the notions of  justice, liberty, and tolerance. In particular, we put forward a stylized model of  society, 
within which individuals are characterized by their ideological traits. We discuss under which conditions 
tensions emerge, and when demand for institutional change builds up. We conclude that today's 
democracies are inherently stable, and that this stability is explained by the socialist notion of  liberty that 
characterizes the vast majority of  the population of  a typical modern society. 
JEL: A12, A13, A14, B52, D02 
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1. From institutions to legal rules 
Institutional analysis has always played a key role in political science and sociology. 
On the one hand, the historical school of  political science has depicted institutions as 
"procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure 
of  the polity", the purpose of  which is to define authority and contain conflicts (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996: 938). In this view, institutional resilience and path-dependence are 
explained by the actions of  the coalitions in power, which rationally try to preserve their 
prerogatives by making change through ordinary law-making difficult; and also by the 
presence of  cultural elements, as a consequence of  which institutions are shaped by the 
individuals' visions of  the world, visions that are in turn affected by the context within 
which individuals operate and develop their beliefs and opinions, particularly about 
social goals and about the purpose and scope of  government (Steinmo, 1992). On the 
other hand, sociologists maintain that institutions are ultimately the expression of  the 
community's shared beliefs (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Thus, sociological 
institutionalism lays considerable emphasis on people's perception of  the existing 
system of  laws, government agencies, and procedures, and analyzes the possible 
tensions between the moral standards of  a society and the formal and informal 
structures in place within that society.  
Despite their numerous points of  contact, however, the historical and the 
sociological views have originated two different research agendas. Historical scholars 
have been trying to assess what kind of  shocks interrupt a path-dependent process and 
how the actors involved react to shocks. By contrast, the sociological context has been 
discussing the notion of  legitimacy, which ensures that the individual recognizes an 
institution as the source of  authority and is ready to comply. 
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The economics profession has also been aware of  the importance of  the 
institutional dimension. As Adam Smith pointed out over two centuries ago, institutions 
affect individual action, influence cooperation, and are crucial in making the difference 
between wealth and poverty, growth and stagnation.1 Not surprisingly, therefore, 
speculation about the role and purpose of  the "humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction" (North 1990: 3) has generated a substantial literature.2 From the 
institutional perspective, however, the real challenge is not about searching, designing, 
and maintaining the best institutions. Rather, it is about explaining why individuals 
tolerate and possibly support the institutions they have, even when those institutions 
have failed to deliver the expected results - say in terms of  material wealth or income 
growth. And it is about investigating what moves them to look for substantial 
institutional change.  
In this paper we abandon the traditional institutional analytical agenda and focus 
on the last two questions - institutional tolerance and institutional tensions3 -- by 
framing an interdisciplinary approach that draws from the traditions of  political-science, 
sociology, and economics.4 In this section we argue that tolerance for the existing order 
originates from the individual's evaluation of  the current system of  legal rules, which 
are judged according to their ability to obtain desirable goals and to respect one's 
deontological principles. Section 2. explains to which extent people are willing to 
tolerate deviations from their ideal institutional environments, while section 3. analyzes 
how different groups of  individuals react to the tensions created by excessive deviations 
(the liberty gaps). Following from this, section 4. puts forward a theory of  institutional 
dynamics based on ideological change, and section 5. concludes.  
1.1 Grand principles and ordinary law-making 
We begin our investigation by distinguishing between ‘grand principles’ and 
‘ordinary law-making’ (Hayek 1960, Ménard 1995). Grand principles are deontological 
concepts and correspond to shared beliefs about ‘fundamental rights’ (‘justice’ and 
‘fairness’ - these terms will be used interchangeably) that may or may not be detailed in 
formal documents. For example, most individuals within a given community would 
agree that all the members of  the community should be free from need. This principle 
is often mentioned in official documents (constitutions) as a generic social commitment 
to solidarity and is a principle to which few citizens would object. Yet, grand principles 
need to be made operational. To this purpose, ordinary laws are created to fill in the 
details and transform principles into actions. Thus, ordinary law-making gives substance 
                                                 
1  Adam Smith underscored the role of  institutions both in The Theory of  Moral Sentiments (e.g. in Part III) 
and in the Wealth of  Nations (e.g. in Book V). See also Buchanan (1976) and Elsner (1989) on the 
Smithian insights into institutional analysis.  
2  See for instance the surveys and references suggested in Hodgson (1989, 2004) and Sen (2009: 
Introduction). See also Hodgson (2000), who emphasizes the vantage point of  the old-institutional 
scholars (from Veblen to Hamilton and Galbraith). 
3  In this paper ‘institutions’ are a ‘system of  legal rules’. Thus, institutional tolerance and tensions refer to 
people's attitudes towards the system of  legal rules in place. 
4  A similar methodological approach has been suggested by Thelen (2003), and has been later used by 
Gilley (2008) in order to identify three different traditions - economic institutionalism, socio-political 
institutionalism and historical institutionalism - and to put forward a "legitimacy-based approach". 
However, Gilley's notion of  legitimacy is narrower than ours. 
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to the generic notion of  poverty relief  and enforces redistribution, by imposing suitable 
taxation, and by establishing and funding agencies responsible for managing poverty-
relief  programmes, including the distribution of  merit goods and outright transfers of  
money.  
1.2 Tolerance 
Conformity to grand principles defines the effectiveness and legitimacy of  
ordinary legal rules.5 Of  course, in an ideal world, all ordinary institutions are perfectly 
congruent with one's sense of  justice and thus perfectly legitimate. Yet, reality is never 
perfect, and individuals are aware that the quest for perfection is vain and understand 
that tolerance of  deviation from an ideal is an ingredient of  peaceful cohabitation. For 
the purpose of  this paper, we suggest that this tolerance depends on three variables. 
The first relates to the individual's perception of  the social covenant (social legitimacy), 
i.e. of  the moral standards that one believes are shared by most members of  the 
community. In particular, tolerance is enhanced when the individual perceives that he is 
part of  a cohesive community founded on widely shared principles: in other words the 
content of  the social covenant is relatively well defined. Thus, the individual accepts and 
respects ordinary laws consistent with the implicit, recognizable covenant characterizing 
that community, even when these shared standards do not totally coincide with his own.  
The second variable relates to conformity with the rule of  law (procedural 
legitimacy), i.e. to the policymakers' compliance with the prescribed, agreed-upon 
procedures, independent of  the substantive desirability of  the law (Mueller and 
Landsman 2004). This is frequently the case in mature democracies, in which majority or 
super-majority decision-making procedures prevail and are accepted as legitimate even 
when consistency with the grand principles appears doubtful. Under these 
circumstances, the greater is the role of  procedural legitimacy, the greater the 
importance of  the electorate as judge of  the policy-makers' right to legislate. Once one 
accepts to play according to given rules, and such rules are applied fairly and 
consistently, withdrawing from the social contract would be unjustified.  
The third variable is civility, which refers to instinct, education and experience, 
and which implies consistency with the behaviour that one expects from the other 
members of  his community. Put differently, civility characterizes the individual's 
perceptions of  the interactions among the various members of  the community, which 
can meet the standards of  honesty, charity and mutual trust, or which can come closer 
to the Hobbesian perspective on human nature (hostility, possibly accompanied by 
violence). A community lacking civility is a community the members of  which hardly 
respect each other, are prone to cheating, are inclined to take advantage of  people's 
weaknesses or carelessness, and frequently decline to offer disinterested help. In other 
words, a group of  people featuring a quasi-Hobbesian state of  nature show that they do 
not believe that they should comply with any code of  fair behaviour and that most 
attempts to cooperate will be stifled. Clearly, lack of  civility is different than breaking 
ordinary laws and thus might not involve sanctions, but loss of  reputation. Yet, the 
                                                 
5  The political-science literature has coined the concepts of  "affective support" and "diffuse support" in 
order to characterize people's attitude towards current institutional contexts. Thus, legitimacy is 
"defined as a person's conviction that the system conforms to his/her moral or ethical principles about 
what is right in the political sphere" (Muller et al., 1982: 241). See also Berggren et al. (2013) for a recent 
contribution to the economics literature. 
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lower the degree of  civility in a society, the fewer the possibilities for fruitful interaction 
(not only in material terms) and the more individuals feel uncomfortable about an 
institutional context that is unable to enhance cooperation with a view to obtaining 
common goals. 
2. Liberties, tolerance and institutional stability 
Following from our emphasis on the role of  legitimacy, therefore, in this section 
we study how humans perceive the institutional context; while we devote sections 3 and 
4 to exploring the dynamics of  institutions and the mechanics of  institutional 
interaction. Section 5 concludes by taking stock and reassessing the agenda for future 
research in the realm of  institutions. 
2.1 Absolute and civil liberties 
As mentioned earlier, beliefs about justice play a significant role in the 
development of  the individual's social preferences and his assessment of  legal order. In 
particular, we posit that each person elaborates his own notion of  justice by following 
two different criteria. The first criterion is defined by the range of  rights that he feels 
are innate to human nature, that belong to him from birth and upon which nobody 
should encroach. Blackstone called these rights the individual's set of  "absolute 
liberties". Of  course, different individuals may have different opinions about the 
content of  these absolute rights. For example, some people might think that they have 
no rights other than those produced and assigned by the state. By contrast, others might 
believe that each individual has a right to physical integrity, freedom of  movement and 
unfettered private property,6 no matter what ordinary law-making prescribes.7 
Yet, there is no guarantee that one's absolute liberties are respected. For example, 
although most people would agree that cheating and mugging someone are violations of  
the victim's absolute rights, individuals are still vulnerable to criminal misbehaviour. Put 
differently, when we enter a community - or assess our role within the society in which 
we happen to be born - we pursue two different goals. We aspire to enjoy the absolute 
liberties to which we believe we have a right; but we also realize that our absolute 
liberties cannot be fully enjoyed unless they are properly protected (Locke, 1689a/1764: 
148 and 1689b/2010: 12) and that orderly interaction with the other members of  the 
community is instrumental in obtaining our happiness (Humboldt 1852/1993: 10-11 
and 27; Granovetter 1985). In a word, we are ready to accept cooperative agreements to 
ensure protection and enhance our human potential, even if  this might require some 
compromise. That explains why most people are willing to join a community, follow its 
rules, and give up some of  their absolute rights.  
                                                 
6  See Blackstone (1753/1893: vol. 1, chapter 1) and also Humboldt (1852/1993: 6), who referred to "the 
freedom of  private life".  
7 It has been suggested that one’s notion of  liberty could be explained by his opinions, rather than by his 
views of  natural rights, and thus could be modeled as a knowledge problem. The point is well taken. We 
insist on natural rights, however, because in our context, individuals believe that their understanding of  
liberty rests on natural rights, rather than on opinions; and that, therefore, the political authorities have 
no rights to impose compromises. Put differently, a political authority just needs broad consensus in 
order to disregard an opinion, but it needs explicit individual consent to violate a natural right. Hence, 
arbitrary disregard for an opinion does not involve a loss of  legitimacy, whereas arbitrary violation of  a 
natural right does.  
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The second criterion an individual uses in developing his own notion of  justice is 
"civil liberty, which […] is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws 
(and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of  the public" 
(Blackstone, 1753/1893: vol. 1, chapter 1). In accordance with Blackstone, therefore, we 
call civil liberty the bundle of  rights left to the individual once he becomes part of  a 
society, rights that are in fact strengthened (i.e. enforced more effectively) as a 
consequence of  government intervention. In this context, we assume that the state is 
the main producer and enforcer of  those human laws that end up restraining 
Blackstone's absolute liberties. Clearly, the smaller is the set of  civil liberties, i.e. the 
absolute liberties the individual can enjoy after the introduction of  laws, the greater the 
role of  government.  
To complete our line of  reasoning, we suggest that desirable state intervention is 
not only instrumental in guaranteeing one's absolute liberties and defining the extent of  
one's civil liberties, but that the nature and quality of  government intervention also 
affects economic performance. Put differently, legitimacy requires that government 
intervention focus on the areas deemed legitimate by the population: for example, 
extensive government intervention might be appreciated when it enhances the 
production of  public or merit goods, less so when it engages in arbitrary redistribution 
or bad projects, or when it distorts incentives through unjustified subsidies and barriers 
to competition. When economic performance worsens, tensions might emerge, since 
individuals believe that the cost of  government encroachment is too high and that the 
institutional context must be reconsidered. 
2.2 Two extreme views 
If  one observes the real world, one can argue that a society generally includes 
individuals possessing different notions of  absolute liberty and also varying propensities 
to compromise on their absolute principles, for the sake of  economic performance 
and/or to enhance the enforcement of  their fundamental principles. In particular one 
can imagine that people are aligned between two extremes - the libertarian and the 
socialist.8  
According to the libertarians, the notion of  absolute rights is encapsulated in 
Blackstone's list of  absolute liberties. These individuals realize that they need an agency 
with the power to protect their physical integrity and property rights, and to enforce 
contracts. They realize that once the security agency - call it "government" - starts 
operating, it might take advantage of  its powers and engage in activities that go beyond 
what is needed to provide security and contract enforcement. Yet, the libertarians may 
deem that this is a cost worth paying, as long as abuse remains within limits. In other 
words, if  government intervention is moderate, the libertarians are happy to bear the 
                                                 
8  A libertarian view is anchored to the freedom-from-coercion principle. In brief, according to the 
libertarians nobody has the right to force individual A to act against its own will, unless individual A is 
bound by an explicit contract. Thus, this general principle rules out physical aggression, cheating and 
encroachment upon private property. By contrast, the socialist view holds that the collective interest 
prevails upon the private interest and that, therefore, a legitimate authority can disregard individual 
preferences and force the individual to act in accord with the goals pursued by the authority. Our 
libertarian/socialist dichotomy echoes Humboldt (1852/1993: chapter 1), who distinguished between 
the minimal state, which aims at securing individual freedom from coercion and possibly contract 
enforcement; and the modern state, which acts on behalf  of  the individual citizen and provides for his 
welfare by producing selected goods and services and enforcing redistribution. 
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cost of  diminished absolute liberties, because the civil liberties they enjoy create more 
opportunities to be happy and enhance their material wellbeing (economic growth) than 
the liberties they would enjoy in isolation. By contrast, if  rent-seeking is substantial and 
economic performance trails off, libertarians feel that the sacrifices they incur in terms 
of  absolute liberty are unjustified, and the demand for civil liberties is greater. 
At the opposite end of  the spectrum is the socialist stereotype, according to 
which society needs significant government intervention in order to compensate for the 
presence of  market failures and income inequalities. From this perspective, therefore, 
although a socialist society would end up with a relatively low degree of  civil liberties, its 
members find that their ideal of  justice is satisfied, since social efficiency and equality 
clearly need regulation and redistribution. Of  course, an environment in which 
legislators take advantage of  their prerogatives and encourage wastages would be 
problematic. Yet, this outcome would not raise major doubts about the role and size of  
government; rather, it would merely elicit reform, so as to make the current rules more 
effective. In other words, a socialist would not question the role of  government and 
would rationally accept disappointing growth if  this is the price to pay to obtain equality 
and to make selected merit goods available. Hence, reform would focus on closing 
loopholes and remedying scandalous situations, rather than changing the role or the 
goals of  legal rules.  
2.3 Liberty gaps, tolerance and economic performance 
Let us now turn to individuals' attitudes towards the prevailing institutional 
context. We have observed that a population is composed of  groups of  individuals 
whose preferences vary between the libertarian and the socialist extremes. It follows 
that, except in highly homogenous communities, the civil liberties characteristic of  a 
democratic society are necessarily the result of  an arrangement according to which the 
majority of  the population agrees on a tolerable compromise, so that the liberty actually 
enjoyed by each member of  the community probably differs from his ideal, but is still 
preferable to the alternatives - a worse compromise or no compromise at all (the 
Hobbesian state of  nature). We shall henceforth identify the difference between the 
actual and desired civil liberties as the ‘liberty gap’. Given the actual civil liberties, 
therefore, the liberty gap depends on one's notion of  absolute liberty and - especially 
for those individuals close to the libertarian ideal -- on economic performance.  
Tolerance is what makes the liberty gap acceptable and contributes to making a 
society stable by reducing pressure for institutional change. When tolerance is great 
enough, individuals are satisfied with their condition: they believe that they are living 
within a shared social covenant, that the government is not abusing its powers. In other 
words, tolerance is embedded in the assumptions that give rise to political life and for 
which the social covenant is instituted: it draws both on the Hobbesian view according 
to which the liberty gap is the cost the individual must bear in order to secure greater 
advantage; and on the Lockean claim that men are also driven by their feelings of  a 
moral commitment towards other men, despite their differences.9  
                                                 
9  See Gauthier (1977), who draws attention to Locke's vision, according to which morality means 
consistency with the divine law, expressed in the law of  nature; and Locke's Second Treatise of  Government, 
in which he argues that "the first and fundamental natural law […] is the preservation of  the society, 
and (as far as will consist with the public good) of  every person in it" (chapter XI, §134) and "A man, 
as has been proved, […] having in the state of  nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty or 
possession of  another, but only so much as the law of  nature gave him for the preservation of  himself  
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3. The libertarian and the socialist reactions to tensions 
Let us now explore some implications of  the analysis suggested in the previous 
section. It is clear from our reasoning that tolerance is crucial. In particular, its absence 
might generate cumulative phenomena, since the individual's tolerance also depends on 
his perception of  the others' attitude: if  everybody cheats, one might be less inclined to 
be honest, to abide by the rules, and to respect institutions. In section 1.2 we pointed 
out that tolerance depends on social and procedural legitimacy of  government action, as 
well as on one's perception that most of  the other members of  the community are civil. 
In other words, when people observe that they are living in a community characterized 
by legitimate institutions and civility, they feel encouraged not to betray trust (no 
cheating, no free riding, limited rent-seeking) and they also feel it is their duty to 
monitor and publicly expose wrong behaviour. As a result, tolerance increases further 
and becomes a self-reinforcing mechanism. By contrast, if  misbehaviour is widespread 
and the institutional context is discredited, trust is eroded and the cost of  flouting the 
rules drops:10 why should one be honest and run the risk of  being tricked or deceived 
while everybody else - including government authorities -- is misbehaving?  
In order to investigate the implications when tensions emerge, we distinguish 
between the reactions typical of  the layers of  the population closer to the libertarian 
camp from those of  those characterizing individuals closer to the socialist view. 
3.1 The libertarian reaction 
Following from the line of  thinking articulated in the earlier sections, tensions 
emerge if  an ideological shock and/or unexpected poor performance broaden the 
liberty gap.11 In particular, instability arises if  the shocks or poor economic performance 
occur when tolerance is relatively low. When this happens, tolerance is likely to fall 
further, the policymakers shorten their time horizon and possibly engage in more 
intense rent-seeking: economic performance suffers, and the liberty gap widens further. 
As mentioned above, speed matters and less than radical responses might not be enough 
to redress the situation. But if  enough people really believe that radical change is 
required, radical change does take place.  
The above mechanism is self-evident when the shock originates from an 
ideological change following which individuals resent government intrusion to larger 
extent. The role of  the liberty gap is also apparent when tensions originate from poor 
economic performance. True, if  economic outcomes are only occasionally disappointing 
(due, for example, to cyclical crisis), the liberty gap is not going to be affected, insofar as 
agents are tolerant enough to absorb the shock. Thus, the members of  the society who 
cherish absolute freedoms and are more demanding in terms of  economic performance 
are unlikely to advocate radical changes in the legal rules. When crisis presents structural 
                                                                                                                                          
and the rest of  mankind" (chapter XI, §135).  
10  This point had already been noted in Adam Smith's Wealth of  Nations (Book V.ii.f  and k). More 
recently, Zak and Knack (2001: 317) show that "cheating is more likely (and trust is therefore lower) 
when the social distance between agents is larger, formal institutions are weaker, social sanctions against 
cheating are ineffective". 
11  We remind the reader that the liberty gap is a function of  the difference between desirable and civil 
liberties, as well as of  the difference between actual and expected economic performance (see section 
2.3).  
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features, however, the liberty gap that these individuals are willing to tolerate shrinks. If  
legitimacy or civility is insufficient, pressure for change occurs. Similar to the previous 
case, if  the attempts to revitalize economic performance are timely and successful, 
equilibrium is restored. Otherwise, demand for institutional change builds up, and the 
social environment rapidly deteriorates. 
3.2 On socialist behaviour 
In the previous paragraphs, we have argued that societies in which liberal views 
prevail are stable when they rely on a significant stock of  tolerance: tolerance cushions 
cyclical changes in economic conditions and relatively small alterations in the ideological 
climate. Can one make the same claim for the members of  a socialist community?  
As pointed out in section 2.2, for our purposes the liberal and socialist 
perspectives diverge in two respects. First, their notion of  absolute liberty differs, so 
that the size and - most importantly - the direction of  their liberty gap is not the same: 
while in a libertarian context, the institutional environment might be delegitimized by 
excessive government intervention and insufficient liberties, the opposite holds true in 
socialist societies, who believe that justice is enhanced by government intervention and 
by curtailing some individuals' liberties in the name of  equality. Furthermore, when 
economic performance slows down, a society in which the liberals prevail reacts by 
advocating de-regulation and more liberties in order to reduce the greater liberty gap. By 
contrast, a society featuring socialist traits reacts by advocating improved policy-making, 
a more effective bureaucracy, and more rigorous monitoring. In other words, since a 
socialist vision gives priority to the welfare state and redistribution, it takes a long time 
before stagnation or recession undermine the legitimacy of  the institutional framework. 
From his vantage point, therefore, tensions emerge because of  disappointment with 
performance, not because pervasive and intrusive rule-making is "bad" or perceived 
differently than before. 
From the extreme socialist perspective, therefore, institutional stability can only be 
threatened by ideological change, as a result of  which the agents come closer to the 
libertarian view or advocate a greater role for government intervention, depending on 
the direction of  the change. Certainly, when the shared ideology changes, the current 
institutional context can seem inadequate. For example, if  people require greater income 
equality and stricter regulation, the liberty gap widens and the search for rents and 
guarantees intensifies, to the detriment of  economic performance. Contrary to the 
libertarian case, however, an increase in rent-seeking and a decline in performance do 
not affect the rules of  the game, which prove resilient (stable). People might be unhappy 
about the state of  the economy, since everybody would like to be better off. Yet, unless 
further ideological change occurs, pressure for institutional change is going to be weak. 
Pressure will be for the government to do more to remedy perceived problems, but 
there will be no demands to change the vision of  what the government does. 
4. Interaction and change 
The upshot of  the previous two sections is straightforward. In most societies, the 
rules of  the game to which individuals voluntarily subscribe necessarily feature a mix of  
civil liberties positioned between the ideal desired by the libertarians and that sought by 
the socialists. Compromise and institutional stability are guaranteed if  the liberty gap is 
bridged by tolerance, i.e. if  the social contract is clear enough and most of  the 
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population plays according to the agreed-upon principles of  social and procedural 
justice. When these requirements are met, people recognize the legitimacy of  the 
institutional context, peacefully cooperate, and pursue their own visions of  happiness. 
Tensions might surface from time to time, but they tend to play a minor role, since most 
members of  the community sincerely believe that they should content themselves with 
what they have and that institutional change would be unlikely to better their condition. 
In partial accordance with the historical literature, therefore, one could indeed 
argue that a society that is initially stable is bound to remain stable unless hit by a shock 
that delegitimizes the institutional context because the grand principles have changed. 
Thus, such a society follows a path-dependent process (inertia), in that ordinary law 
making consists in accommodating to the last shock, until something new occurs 
(Young, 1996). Certainly, the legislators might also introduce adjustments in response to 
technological innovation or cyclical fluctuation, or as a result of  the political quest for 
consensus. If  the society's grand principles and the notion of  liberty are constant, and if  
law-making adjustments do not affect the civil liberties enjoyed by the population, the 
underlying element of  tolerance is strengthened and the social structure becomes more 
resilient to shocks. By contrast, if  policymakers do get carried away and interfere with 
civil liberties, and if  tolerance is thin, then tensions come to the surface, with possible 
cumulative effects. 
Thus, absent serious ideological crises, which are the core of  the sociological 
approach, in our perspective the critical element leading to the emergence of  possibly 
serious institutional unrest is the presence of  a large enough group of  individuals 
receptive to the libertarian view on government, more sensitive to the link between 
economic performance and institutional legitimacy, and therefore more inclined to ask 
for institutional change even when the shared notion of  justice stays constant. The 
implication is that when the libertarian component is weak, society is stable even in the 
presence of  economic crises: it requires disaster or virtual disaster before the underlying 
nature of  the legal rules is questioned.12  
Our analysis also suggests a few additional conclusions: First, ideological 
minorities do not pose major social problems for communities characterized by a clearly 
identifiable social covenant with which the population complies spontaneously. Put 
differently, as long as the social contract is clear, rent-seeking is contained, and 
everybody plays according to the rules of  the game.  
Second, stagnation or recession is certainly likely to provoke widespread 
resentment, but it brings about institutional crisis only when the libertarian component 
is substantial and tolerance dwindles. Under such circumstances, a community closer to 
the libertarian ideal would undergo structural change, while a socialist-oriented 
community would press for better regulation and monitoring in order to attain existing 
goals.  
Third, finding an institutional solution to unrest becomes critical when the liberty 
gap is large and tolerance -- legitimacy and/or civility -- is weak. This becomes even 
more problematic when such a society is also fragmented into many groups and loyalty 
to the group is more important than overall community cohesion. Then, the fragility of  
the social covenant becomes apparent, and respect for its clauses is weak. At that point, 
two outcomes can emerge. Some groups may end up hoping to exploit the system to 
                                                 
12  This possibility had already been conceived by Tocqueville (1835-1840/2010: 1261). See also Berggren 
et al. (2011) on the relation between stability and growth. 
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acquire privileges (slick conformists); or rent-seeking becomes such a drain on the 
economy that the advocates of  social justice revise their position and eventually accept 
free-market reforms to revive economic performance. 
All in all, we admit that the dynamics of  ideological change – and thus legitimacy 
− remain hard to define. As we have argued elsewhere, however, we believe that shared 
beliefs are almost exogenous. Although people are indeed influenced by what they see 
around and what they have inherited from the past, genuine ideological change is a very 
rare event and requires momentous shocks that radically affect the way people perceive 
the role of  the individual in a social context. Typical examples were the Gregorian 
Revolution in the late eleventh century13 and the Thirty Year War in the seventeenth 
century: the first sparked the debate on the source and legitimacy of  the political 
authority, whereas the latter undermined the foundations of  the divine order on earth.14  
Although generalizations are often deceptive, we suggest that Western societies 
are presently under the influence of  the ideological change sparked by the World War I, 
as a result of  which for most people the notion of  absolute liberty has come relatively 
close to the socialist ideal. As witnessed by the increase in government expenditure and 
regulation that has characterized the past decades, it appears that the vast majority of  
the population in much of  the Western world is fairly happy with a limited version of  
absolute liberty. In other words, most of  us are close to the socialist end of  the 
spectrum and not inclined to question the current view on social justice, no matter how 
disappointing economic performance might be. As result, today's modern societies 
feature a rather limited liberty gap and, thus, the willingness to change the role of  
government is fairly small. Government intervention therefore turns into a matter of  
fine tuning, but its scope and nature are not really doubted. In this light, investigating 
the drivers of  institutional change in a society by looking at grand principles does not 
pay.  
Rather, the challenge faced by the social scientist is to assess what kind of  shocks 
can break inertia and how to articulate the mechanics of  unwarranted change. To repeat 
our earlier point, tensions do not necessarily generate a new approach to ordinary law 
making, although they might create opportunities for populism and rent-seeking. The 
traditional institutional literature remains rather vague on both points. We have tried to 
make some progress by suggesting that tolerance with respect to the liberty gap is 
decisive to trigger institutional crisis, and that this gap is defined by legitimacy and 
civility. Put differently, discomfort with the current state of  affairs might bring about 
tensions and discontent and the implicit social bonds that constitute the essence of  
social cooperation might be shaken. Yet, discontent about one's own situation does not 
necessarily imply that one elaborates or imagines a new vision on the nature and 
purpose of  legal rules inspired by a consistent vision of  liberty and individual 
responsibility. In fact, discontent must be deep enough to overcome the institutional 
                                                 
13  The Gregorian Revolution is named after Pope Gregory VII, who challenged the primacy of  the 
secular ruler and raised the question of  legitimate power. The debate that followed involved inquiries 
into “the notions of  natural order and divine will on the one hand, and the assessment of  the nature 
and goals of  the individual within society on the other” (Colombatto, 2011: 83). See also Berman (1983, 
chapter 2). 
14  It might be observed that the term "shock" is in fact rather misleading, since it conveys the idea that 
change takes place rather rapidly, in a few days or weeks. In fact, ideological shocks may take decades or 
even centuries to unfold. For instance, the full consequences of  secularization became visible only in 
the nineteenth century. 
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transition costs (broadly understood). Moving from one set of  institutions to another is 
not easy, since obsolete legislation must be scrapped, a new consensus must be found, 
new laws passed, and one is never sure about the outcome, which might easily differ 
from expectations. In the end, unless the liberty gap reaches a critical threshold, and 
unless uncertainties and inertias are overcome, the outcome is conformism, grumbling 
and rent-seeking, while existing institutions adjust at the margins, with no substantial 
change. 
5. What do we make of  institutional economics?  
This article is inspired by the belief  that individuals' attitudes and willingness to 
interact, exchange and cooperate are not entirely the outcome of  a common 
evolutionary story. Our very nature as human beings presumes our ability to choose 
whether to give in to our instincts and emotional drives, or rather engage in rational sets 
of  actions, possibly restrained by value judgments (morals).  
A similar line of  reasoning holds true for the institutional context: legal rules do 
not emerge spontaneously,15 nor are they accepted independently of  what they mean 
and imply. Value judgments and rational compromise feature prominently in the 
emergence and acceptance of  legislation and we suggest that all stable, complex 
institutional arrangements are characterized by ideological components. Following from 
this, we have argued that the political science, the sociological and the economics 
literatures have much to say, but none of  them taken in isolation can articulate a fully 
satisfactory explanation of  what we observe. For example, Chen et al. (1997) developed 
an index of  legitimacy for China, and concluded that although the Chinese were not 
particularly happy about the economic performance of  their country, they thought that 
the institutional context was satisfactory - a result also confirmed by Gilley (2008), with 
some qualifications. Hence, the authors conclude that the institutional system is stable. 
Yet, from the standpoint suggested in the present paper, this information is incomplete 
and the conclusion unwarranted. In particular, the crucial question is not whether the 
Chinese institutional environment is stable, but how performing the economy must be 
in order to avoid tensions, whether the Chinese society can really be considered 
ideologically homogeneous (as the authors assume), and what drives institutional change 
and in which direction.16 From a different angle, the literature has been investigating the 
connection between economic performance and regime change - say democratic 
breakdowns as a result of  economic crisis (Gasiorowski, 1995). The results obtained are 
ostensibly inconclusive: we suggest that economic performance alone says little, if  it is 
not analyzed in terms of  institutional tolerance/legitimacy. 
In particular, in this paper we have tried to analyze the nature of  institutional 
tensions and the consequences these tensions might generate. We have pointed out that, 
when unrest comes to the surface, policy-makers can react by following different 
patterns. They can operate at the margin by adjusting ordinary law-making and keeping 
the liberty gap within tolerable limits, in order to diffuse pressures. Or they could 
acknowledge the existence of  a new context of  grand principles and engage in deep 
                                                 
15  Of  course, institutions might be the unintended result of  the agents' actions. But this does not mean 
that they emerge spontaneously. For example, informal rules are the product of  repeated intentional 
actions, while formal rules are often the result of  a conscious decision by the law-giver.  
16  Of  course, the new-institutional economist would say that the driver is economic performance. See 
however Przeworski (2004) for a word of  caution.  
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change. Generally, however, populism, expediency, and marginal adjustments prevail in 
fragmented societies, and the grand principles are very rarely questioned. Individuals 
might feel frustrated in their efforts to improve their condition, and they might be aware 
that the current body of  laws is responsible for the lack of  opportunities and 
disappointing economic conditions. Yet, lack of  agreement on a new, widely shared 
ideological structure prevents new notions of  social justice from emerging and 
overhauling the institutional context. This is particularly true when the cost of  transition 
remains uncertain; it is magnified in societies with a socialist tradition, in which the 
sense of  individual responsibility is modest, solutions usually follow a top-down 
process, and bureaucrats or technocrats, who are usually confronted with circumscribed, 
operational problems, are asked to come up with new visions of  the world; and can be 
further aggravated when the population is quickly aging, since elderly people would 
surely suffer from the bumps involved in transition, while the benefits would be 
relatively short-term. To repeat, unease and tensions do not necessarily lead to crises. 
When tolerance for the liberty gap is deeply rooted, institutions can still be accepted 
despite their social legitimacy having dwindled. On the other hand, when discontent is 
significant, the extent to which it degenerates and society becomes vulnerable to rent-
seeking pressures marks the difference between relatively rich economies (in which rent-
seeking is limited or highly inclusive),17 and communities featuring large pockets of  
wasteful privileges, in which cooperation is biased towards personal relationships and 
the opportunities offered by impersonal exchange are overlooked. 
Moreover, our view has emphasized that the debate on the role of  tolerance 
should always be framed in the light of  the existing liberty gap and, therefore, in terms 
of  ideological perspectives, legitimacy and civility. True, today's prevailing emphasis on 
the pragmatic role of  institutions18 seems to strengthen a view according to which 
legitimacy is indeed a question of  material outcomes, rather than of  compliance with 
moral standards. Advocates of  the so-called "Veneer Theory", for example, hold that 
morality is just a hypocritical layer covering up men's purely rational, self-interested core 
(Wright, 1994). We do acknowledge that for most people the notion of  morality might 
be a little vague and that for a substantial number of  individuals fundamental principles 
boil down to the (absolute) right to physical integrity and a generic right to solidarity, the 
rest being subject to debate and negotiation. But we also agree with De Waal (2006), 
who maintains that individuals do have a more or less sophisticated sense of  morality. It 
originates from an evolutionary process that combines passions, emotions and instincts; 
and it gives substance to the Smithian "impartial spectator", who allows us to make 
value judgments about potential goals and behaviours, and to transform subjective 
judgments into general rules also applicable outside the community to which we belong.  
In this vein, the economists' traditional view about how to analyze the evolution 
of  legal rules might need to be reassessed. True, the dynamics of  ordinary institutions is 
                                                 
17  In accordance with Olson (1965), inclusive rent-seeking refers to large coalitions, whose activities are 
likely to produce only limited externalities.  
18  Neglect of  the transcendental vantage point is consistent with mainstream (neoclassical) economics, as 
well as with the position held by influential thinkers. For example, in the early 1940s Frank Knight 
advocated the discovery of  morality through discussion (van Horn and Emmett 2011). In a similar vein, 
although from different quarters, Amartya Sen held that justice should be defined by rationally debating 
its content, starting from a broad enough definition and keeping only those elements that do not solicit 
substantial objections. It might be worth pointing out that common to these lines of  thought is that 
morality is ultimately to be defined by intellectuals. 
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powered by the interaction between concerns for efficiency and pressures from different 
interest groups; and is also influenced by significant institutional costs (inertia). Still, the 
kind of  game and the playing ground that determine the range of  actions and reactions 
are to be defined at a higher level. Neglect for this component runs the risk of  
transforming institutional analyses either into empirical exercises in ex-post determinism, 
or into generic models according to which everything depends on everything. 
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